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Abstract
We examine the social burden associated with resilience to environmental shocks in pre-modern societies.We argue that analyses
of state-level interventions to mitigate the consequences of catastrophic events tend to isolate these measures from their larger
social contexts and thereby overlook the uneven distribution of their burden across different groups. We use three cases of pre-
modern societies in the northeastern Mediterranean - the sixth century Roman Empire, the tenth century Byzantine Empire, and
the sixteenth century Ottoman Empire. We demonstrate how the adaptive processes that reinforced resilience at the state level
incurred different burdens for those at lower levels of the social hierarchy. We found that some groups sustained losses while
others gained unexpected benefits in the context of temporary systemic instability. We also found that although elites enjoyed
enhanced buffers against the adverse effects in comparison with non-elites, this did not consistently guarantee them a better
outcome. We conclude that the differentiated burden of resilience could in some cases entrench existing political or economic
configurations, and in other cases, overturn them. Our case studies indirectly address the pressing issue of environmental justice.
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Introduction
The popularity of resilience in academic literature and policy-
making has increased over the past few decades (Folke 2006).
Resilience, in the sense of bouncing back after an unexpected
shock, was originally used to conceptualize natural systems. The
term was soon introduced to the social systems and even the
humanities (e.g., for archaeology Redman and Kinzig 2003;
Redman 2005). As its use expanded, however, some have argued
against its usefulness (Joseph 2013; Olsson et al. 2015).
Social science research usually presents resilience as an
attractive attribute or goal of economic and political systems.
Analyses of resilience may therefore influence decision-
makers seeking to achieve resilience for a business, agency,
or entire government. In these contexts, the pursuit of
resilience by one organization may be isolated from its effects
on sub-, supra-, and parallel systems. How the resilience of
one component of a society affects other groups and institu-
tions within the same society is therefore less frequently
discussed (Olsson et al. 2015).
Nevertheless, resilience often incurs costs, which are often
externalized and unevenly distributed across different social
classes and environments. Although theoretically possible,
cases in which resilience benefits everyone and everything
alike are rare. Policy-makers pursuing resilience must face
questions raised by Cote and Nightingale (2012) about resil-
ience Bof what^ and in particular Bfor who;^ these questions
may in turn raise ethical dilemmas regarding the maintenance
of power structures and vested interests. For example, the
scholarly discourse of resilience as a concept had incorporated
neo-liberal ideals such as an emphasis on individual adaptabil-
ity from an early point (e.g., Holling 2001; for neo-liberalism
see Harvey 2005). Subsequent scholars have critiqued the
concept and in particular its use in policy literature, asserting
that the discourse surrounding resilience perpetuates neo-
liberal views of governance (Joseph 2013; for similar
developments in climate impact studies, see Hulme 2011).
The three case studies below examine complex societies in
the northeastern Mediterranean (the Roman, Byzantine, and
Ottoman empires) and the ways in which they spread the
social burden of resilience across their different constituent
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groups. Each occupied a similar geographical region where
they represented the dominant political, economic and cultural
force. They proved to be sustainable and adaptable socio-
political entities that survived and thrived for centuries.
Despite changes of names, dynasties and religions, there were
a number of key structural continuities between them, espe-
cially in the case of the Roman and Byzantine empires.
Our research concerns the socio-cultural burden of resil-
ience in these three complex pre-modern societies. Each en-
countered socio-environmental challenges in the form of nat-
ural and social disasters, adverse climate and pathogenic dis-
ease, which interacted with the system’s vulnerabilities. In
each case, the state appears to be a resilient social structure
that was able to mitigate the socio-environmental effects and
adapt to a new reality, maintaining its continuity over time.
However, a closer investigation of the social elements that
constitute the larger system (whether socio-economic groups
such as elites or peasantries, or institutions such as aspects of
the state’s operations, or the church, for example), reveals that
the costs—and benefits—of its resilience were not divided
equally. Rather, in each case the benefits and burdens of resil-
ience were distributed across society unevenly. Resilience (or
vulnerability) in one sector of a society directly impacts its
other sectors in different ways.
Our research corresponds to two of the key questions
of historical ecology raised by Armstrong et al. (2017):
(1) How did past societies respond to sudden environmen-
tal shocks? (2) What factors have made some communi-
ties more adaptable to environmental stress than others? It
also responds to Adamson et al. (2018), who encouraged
more nuanced uses of the past in the study of how soci-
eties adapt to climate change.
Since the environment interacts with human societies rather
than determines their fate, environmental effects are never
uniform for all parts of a society (e.g., Adger 2001; Houston
2008; Sandoval et al. 2014). Each subgroup of a complex
society has its own set of vulnerabilities and thus will be
affected in a different manner as a result of its particular inter-
action with the environment. For example, we would expect
that a drought would have differential effects on farmers living
in a village compared to bureaucrats living in the nearby city.
Even highly destructive events are socially patterned: the iso-
lated, weak, and less wealthy consistently fare worse
(Matthewman 2015: 20), while certain groups can benefit
even when society as a whole suffers (Campbell 2016).
Cutter et al. (2003) aggregated about 20 general factors that
can affect the social vulnerability of individuals or groups.
Using modern data, they found that the most important of
these were personal wealth, age, density of the built environ-
ment, single-sector economic dependence, and housing stock
and tenancy. Together, these five factors explain about 50% of
the variability in social vulnerability at the US county level.
Except for age, which remains unknown for practically all pre-
modern populations at the group level, the other four factors
play a major role in the pre-modern case studies below.
In our analysis we follow Steadman and Ross (2017) and
Tainter (1988) and define complex societies as those that pos-
sessed a common set of institutions beyond kinship bonds that
guided their political, social, economic, and religious organi-
zation. Social complexity is thus an abstract, continuous var-
iable, which is typically correlated with increased population,
inequality, and heterogeneous occupational specialization.
Case Studies from the Premodern Eastern
Mediterranean
The Sixth Century: Disasters and Civic Response
in the Roman Empire
The Levant was one of the richest regions of the Roman
Empire. The interregional trade routes that passed through it
mixed people, goods, and ideas. Speckled with large cities, it
was a cultural and religious center, home to a wealthy, educat-
ed, and Romanized population. This idyllic picture, however,
was shattered over the sixth century when frequent earth-
quakes, multiple waves of bubonic plague, and devastating
enemy attacks strained established political and economic
structures.
Relative to modernity, very little evidence survives for late
antiquity and researchers are dependent chiefly on the results
of archaeological excavations and a few historical texts that
describe politics and war far more frequently than social, cul-
tural, and environmental developments. Within the region, we
know most about the central city of Antioch (Antakya or
Hatay in southeastern Turkey), which experienced more than
36 disasters over the century (Mordechai 2017). Despite the
paucity of direct evidence for other settlements in the region,
they must have experienced many of the same events as
Antioch. To simplify the analysis, we examine this ancient
metropolis and two other cities: Apamea (Afamiya, Syria),
90 km south of Antioch, and Berytus (Beirut, Lebanon), an-
other 190 km southwest. Antioch and Apamea were capitals
of their provinces while Berytus was a major cultural center
(Fig. 1).
Enough independent types of evidence survive to convey
the extent of disruption. Seismic activity in the region in-
creased fourfold over the sixth century (Khair et al. 2000).
Antioch itself experienced several major earthquakes over
the per iod (Guidoboni 1994; Ambraseys 2009) .
Contemporaries described these events, which would affect
other settlements as well, in stark terms such as Balmost the
whole of Antioch collapsed in ruins^ (Chronicle of 724, 143
in Guidoboni 1994: 346) and Ban unquantifiable multitude [of
people] was caught^ in the destruction of Antioch (Evagrios
Scholasticus, trans. Whitby 2000: 6.8). Antioch further
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suffered, among others, from a major fire (525), a Persian sack
(540) after which the city was burned and its residents forcibly
resettled in Persia, and at least four Bwaves^ of the Justinianic
plague (beginning in the early 540s). Only a few scattered
anecdotes describe the fate of Apamea and Berytus. The for-
mer was plundered by the Persians in 540, and again in 573,
when a Persian general looted the city, captured its inhabitants
and burned it (Foss 1997: 205-229). The earthquake of
551 caused substantive damage to Berytus (Darawcheh et al.
2000; Hall 2004).
From the empire’s perspective, this series of disasters en-
dangered its hold on some of its wealthiest regions.
Furthermore, imperial obligations elsewhere limited the re-
sources at the government’s disposal. Yet despite such chal-
lenges, the state maintained its control over Syria throughout
the century. Its strategies included direct investment in the
region and outsourcing some of the tasks to locals through
coercion. Altogether, the sixth-century imperial system dem-
onstrated outstanding resilience at the state level. A closer
examination, however, reveals a more nuanced reality at the
city level and even more variability among the social groups
within each city.
Although one might expect Antioch to have collapsed after
so many disasters, the city survived. While it had not
completely recovered by the time of the Persian conquest
(see below) there is enough evidence to attest to its continued
great size and importance in the late sixth and early seventh
centuries (see for example Evagrios Scholasticus (6.8) who
claims that 60,000 people died in 588, or John of Ephesus
226 [in Payne Smith 1860]). A number of key factors might
explain this surprising outcome.
First, contemporary emperors took a personal interest in the
city’s recovery and wellbeing. For this purpose they infused it
with cash and implemented large-scale reconstruction
projects. Government officials also allocated resources of their
own to rebuild and repopulate Antioch after disasters
(Procopius Buildings, Dewing 1914a: 2.10; Downey 1961:
548-553; Malalas, Jeffreys et al. 1986: 421-24, 444, 450,
452, 470-1; Evagrios Scholasticus 6.8). The imperial govern-
ment further signaled its commitment to maintain Antioch as a
major city through a public relations campaign and free bread
doles (e.g., the city’s name was changed to Theoupolis, liter-
ally BThe City of God,^ Malalas 443; Evagrios Scholasticus
6.8).
In the wake of the numerous disasters that Antioch experi-
enced during the century, these measures lured more inhabi-
tants into the city. For a modern comparison, the post-
destruction rebuilding efforts after the 1908 earthquake in
Messina (Sicily), which killed about half of the city’s pre-
earthquake population (about 150,000), also offered attractive
new opportunities: state-funded jobs, cheap land, and even
looting the ruins. As a result, Messina’s population swelled
to 118% of its pre-earthquake size in 13 years (Restifo 1995;
Parrinello 2012). Similar trends took place in late antique
Antioch as people from its hinterland and other cities in the
region resettled in it and benefited from parallel economic
opportunities. Unfortunately for the residents, the rebuilding
process was cut short by the early seventh century Persian
conquest, which focused the historical narrative on the city’s
decline (e.g., Downey 1961).
Apamea enjoyed far less governmental attention than
Antioch: none of the historical sources that refer to it over
the sixth century mention any type of imperial support follow-
ing the disasters that afflicted it. Prokopios’ Buildings, a pan-
egyric to emperor Justinian (527-565) for his building activi-
ties throughout the empire, includes an entire chapter about
Antioch but does not mention Apamea at all (Procopius
Buildings, Dewing 1914a: 2.10, 5.9.27). Furthermore, few of
Fig. 1 Sites and areas discussed
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the dozens of sixth-century inscriptions in the area mention
the emperor as a sponsor or in an invocation (Trombley 1997).
Apamea was left to its own devices but was not
depopulated or abandoned. The city’s main street and walls
were rebuilt - actions attributed to emperor Justinian al-
though there is no concrete evidence for his involvement.
Building projects in the area continued into the seventh
century but were undertaken by local elites, many of whom
did not list any affiliation they may have had with the cen-
tral government in surviving inscriptions. This alienation
could explain why Apamea’s citizens preferred to surrender
each time the city was threatened (540, 573, 610/1 and ca.
640). In 540 the citizens de facto accepted the Persian king
as their ruler (Procopius, Wars, Dewing 1914b: 2.11.14),
whereas during the Arab conquest (ca. 640) they supposed-
ly greeted the Arab armies with tambourine players and
singers (al Baladhuri, Futuh: 131). Similar capitulations
took place in 573 (John of Ephesus, Payne-Smith 1860:
6.6) and 610/1 (Foss 2003). Archaeological evidence sug-
gests that the city’s elite eventually emigrated to
Constantinople, while the new economic opportunities in
the city lured people from its surroundings who moved into
the houses of the now-absent elite (Balty 1984a). These
migrations changed the nature of the city and its society
became less stratified. Estimating Apamea’s population is
difficult, but coin use in the city appears to have increased
until the late eighth-early ninth century, hinting at more
economic activity (Balty 1984b; Nègre 1984).
Berytus, Bthe jewel of Phoenicia^ (Agathias, Histories,
Frendo 1975: 2.15.2), was a smaller city but a cultural and
economic center. It was a key point for the silk industry,
importing raw material from the east and processing it before
shipping it around the Mediterranean. It also housed a re-
nowned law school that Bconferred an aura of peculiar prestige
and distinction on the place^ (Agathias,Histories: 2.15.3) and
was attended by students from all over the empire. In the 530s
and 540s, centralizing policies drewmuch of the silk trade and
several of the law school’s faculty members to the capital
Constantinople (Procopius, Secret History, Dewing 1914c:
25.13-26; the law school professors went to revise the law,
see Hall 2004: 212-213). While both institutions probably
survived, they would have been left in a more vulnerable state
after losing human and material capital.
According to both literary and archaeological evidence,
the earthquake of 551, which coincided with a tsunami and
caused a major fire, destroyed parts of the city, including
the facilities used for teaching (e.g., Agathias, Histories:
2.15.1-4; Saghieh 1996: 40). Estimates put its local mag-
nitude at 7.3-7.8 and its epicenter was probably a few
kilometers off the shore of the city (Darawcheh et al.
2000; Elias et al. 2007). The surviving written sources
agree that the emperor sent some funds for relief and re-
construction efforts (Hall 2004: 70-75).
There is no evidence that the law schools or the silk indus-
try ever returned to Berytus, and contemporaries lamented the
city’s destruction after the earthquake (Piacenza Pilgrim: 159
in Wilkinson 1977: 79; Iohannes Barbucallus in Paton 1917:
236-237). Although the city disappears from the written
sources almost completely after the vague reference to re-
building, archaeological evidence reveals surprising continui-
ty and even innovation. The ceramic evidence, for example,
shows that local workshops continued to produce pottery but
changed their fabric and firing methods and introduced differ-
ent designs. New pottery imports from northern Palestine ap-
pear on the site, while there is evidence for the city shipping its
local amphorae after a long hiatus (Reynolds 2000:391;
Reynolds andWaksman 2007:61). The plentiful glass material
found at the site suggests that there were enough raw mate-
rials. The number of glass lamps increased dramatically and
new forms began appearing after the earthquake (Jennings
2004-5: 134, 185 and passim). The published coin material
from the city, which can be dated with more precision than the
other types of evidence, shows only a brief drop after the
earthquake, which could be interpreted as evidence for a
short-term decline in monetary activity (Fig. 2).
The central government and its actions had a direct influ-
ence on the trajectory of at least some of the groups in Berytus.
Its centralizing efforts weakened both the law school and the
silk industry in Berytus, which collapsed as a result of the
earthquake, incidentally benefiting the Constantinople silk in-
dustry and law school. After the earthquake the government
also contributed at least partially to the reconstruction of
Berytus, facilitating its survival.
In all three cases, therefore, the state’s resilience had sig-
nificant costs at the city level that were determined by the
interaction between the environment, the state, and specific
cities. We know most about the central government’s actions:
its commitment and support-maintained Antioch as a major
center, but its lukewarm treatment of Apamea undermined the
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Fig. 2 Coins per year in the reigns of emperors between 518 and 602,
found in Berytus excavations. The two black outlines represent the ratios
before and after the earthquake of 551. The coin data (which does not
include hoards) was taken from Butcher 2001-2002; Finkbeiner and
Sader 1997; Nurpetlian 2016a; Nurpetlian 2016b
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loyalty of local elites. The environmental stress in Berytus
coincided with the city’s government-induced vulnerabilities,
resulting in the collapse of its most famous institutions.
This analysis preserves echoes of the choices individuals
had to make within the parameters determined by the interac-
tion between the government and the environment. Villagers
around Antioch who lost the markets to which they exported
their products, people who lost their homes in earthquakes, or
the silk merchants in Berytus were all likely to readjust their
lives to fit a new reality. Others, such as the government con-
tractors who provided the free bread for Antioch, those who
worked at the law schools in Constantinople, and even the
immigrants who took over the mansions in Apamea all
benefited from the same realities.
The extent to which the state was aware of these trends or
tried to reverse them remains unknown because of the lack of
sources. Nonetheless, the elite officials that made up the gov-
ernment must have experienced conflicts of interest between
advancing the collective goals of the institution they led and
their private gain. Such factors, perhaps just as much as stra-
tegic planning, would have determined the nuanced patterns
of resilience in sixth century Roman society.
The Tenth Century: Severe Winter and Social
Transformation in Byzantium
The severe winter and consequent great famine of 927 CE in
the Byzantine Empire represent a classic case of a major
climate-related subsistence crisis that accelerated the pace of
social change, creating opportunities for some social groups at
the same time as aggravating the situation of others. We know
the events in relative detail thanks to contemporary imperial
legislation dealing with provincial land ownership for most of
the tenth century (927-996). This collection of legal docu-
ments contains a number of highly rhetorical passages within
key pieces of state legislation, which set out the reasons for
their promulgation, providing valuable information on their
context (analysed in detail in Kaplan 1992: 414-426; edition
of the Greek text: Svoronos 1994; English translation:
McGeer 2000). The winter and the subsistence crisis of
927 CE are also described in Byzantine hagiographical and
historical accounts (Morris 1976; Telelis 2004: 373). Taken
together, these sources provide a fairly good understanding of
both the environmental and societal aspects of these events.
In the Byzantine cultural memory, the winter of 927-28
stands out as particularly severe, and this period later was
remembered as a time of BGreat Famine.^ Tenth-century
sources describe the winter as characterized by an unusual
cold spell that lasted for as long as 120 days, starting on
Christmas 927 CE. It is unfortunately difficult to translate
the reports of the sources into more precise spatial terms:
one source tradition is very general and gives no geographical
details, while the other one may be coming from Anatolia
(Delehaye 1923: 205 (for Anatolia); Wahlgren 2006: 330;
other sources in all probability deriving from the ones refer-
enced here in Telelis 2004: 373). Surprisingly, whereas the
Byzantine sources unanimously describe the winter as unusu-
ally long and cold, no currently available palaeoclimate proxy
confirms the occurrence of a strong winter cooling, or at least
a potential increase in snowfall, at that time. An annually-
precise regional hydroclimate proxy from Central Anatolia,
Lake Nar, which reflects winter precipitation, shows no sig-
nificant variability for the decades of 920s and 930s (Lake Nar
chronology is based on varve-counting: Jones et al. 2006;
similar conclusions can also be reached when looking at a
chronologically less precise hydroclimate proxy from north-
western Anatolia, the Sofular Cave: Göktürk et al. 2011; for
snowfall and winter tempratures, see the Kocain cave
data, Göktürk 2011). The summer temperature reconstruc-
tions for Europe – strongly correlated with the annual temper-
ature, with the r value of 0.66 – suggest a steady increase in
warmth for the summer months over the 920s and 930s until a
major volcanic eruption occurred in 939 CE (PAGES 2k
Consortium 2013, correlation value: Table 1; Toohey and
Sigl 2017; Oppenheimer et al. 2018) (Fig. 3). Moreover, re-
cent palaeoclimate model simulations for the entire Aegean
area suggest that throughout the 920s average temperatures
remained relatively stable (Xoplaki et al. 2016). To conclude,
it seems that while the winter of 927 CE in Anatolia and the
Southern Balkans (the core territories of the Byzantine Empire
at that time) might have been colder and longer than usual at
that time, as reported in the written sources, there occurred no
major general cooling and some winters during the later tenth
century might have actually been much colder, as suggested
by the European temperature anomalies (Fig. 3).
The apparent discrepancy between the written records and
the palaeoclimate data is worth further investigation. First,
there is no reason to doubt that a famine occurred in some
Byzantine lands in 928 CE. Second, contemporaries seem to
have related it to some kind of unusual winter conditions. If
we are to take the reports of the written sources at face value,
freezing temperatures or frosts would have continued into the
spring months (i.e., until April), shortening the vegetation sea-
son and impeding seed germination (winter conditions were
crucial for the late spring cereal harvest – Geoponica, Beckh
1895: II 14). Given the fact that cereals provided some 30-
50% of the calories consumed by the medieval population,
this could have led to a subsistence crisis (Kaplan 1992: 25-
32; Bourbou et al. 2011; Zuckerman 2016). Thus, the climate-
related shortage-generating mechanism reported by the
sources sounds plausible. However, it is striking that this fam-
ine occurred at the beginning of a centuries-long period of
economic expansion in the Byzantine Empire (Fig. 4).
During such a period, one would expect a society to be resil-
ient enough to buffer environmental stress rather than to ex-
perience a major climate-related famine.
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The necessary clue to understanding what happened in the
Byzantine lands in 928 may be found in the legal sources. In
their description of the social crisis that resulted from the harsh
winter and the poor harvest, they distinguish between the
Bpowerful^ and the Bweak;^ the latter were selling their land
to the former for food or money to save their lives. Closer
analysis reveals that the Bpoor^ were those engaged in phys-
ical labor, while the Bpowerful^ were the Byzantine military
and civil officials paid in cash (usually gold) by the imperial
government (Morris 1976). For centuries, the government in
Constantinople maintained a hierarchy of offices that were
paid in gold by the state to ensure the loyalty of its officials,
a highly unusual institution in the medieval period. In fact,
during the seventh to the tenth century, the gold payments
made by the state to its elites were probably the largest transfer
of currency occurring every year in Anatolia and the Balkans,
and the most important source of revenue for Byzantine elites
(Haldon 2009). As a result, the Bpowerful^ Byzantine officials
had constant access to liquid assets they could invest in land or
any other type of property. This was indeed a rare situation in
an age when the Byzantine economy was primarily not mon-
etized and coin finds are usually associated with the activities
of the state and its officials, a situation which only started to
change in the decades preceding the great winter of 927/928
(see Fig. 4). It is not surprising, therefore, that a climate-
related subsistence crisis – even if the weather conditions were
actually not so unusual compared to the rest of the tenth cen-
tury – provided them with an opportunity to quickly exchange
money for land (for the central role of the socioeconomic
context in creating famines even during major climate-
related food shortages, see Slavin 2016).
This development eventually increased elite control over
the peasants while also disintegrating village communities in
the affected provinces. Since the Byzantine taxation system
was based on villages organized as fiscal units with communal
tax liability (as described in the Farmer’s Law, Medvedev
1984; for a broader discussion, see Morrisson 1991;
Oikonomidès 1996; Górecki 2004), the impoverishment of
peasant producers, the frequent result of selling their land,
eventually began to erode the tax base and the social system
itself. Thus the Bweak^ – or peasants – were not the only ones
whose situation deteriorated as a result of the Bgreat famine.^
The larger-scale socioeconomic change forced the state to
intervene in order to protect its resources and attempt to stop
the processes of transformation that were amplified by the
long winter and the subsistence crisis. Emperor Romanos
Lekapenos (920-944) issued a law in 934, limiting the right
of the powerful to buy peasants’ land. His goal was first of
all to stabilise land ownership patterns and associated tax
structures rather than to help those who had recently suffered
from the famine. The imperial response also aimed at improv-
ing the material situation of the peasantry, but by 934 it was
too late for further relief measures to revert the social transfor-
mation that had been taking place (Kaplan 1992, p. 421-426).
In other words, the emperor’s goal with this particular lawwas
to stop the ongoing social change rather than react directly to
the immediate consequences of the winter of 927-928 (which
he probably did, but it did not reverse the trend toward the
social change either - Wahlgren 2006: 330).
A comparison of the palaeoclimate, pollen, archaeological,
and written evidence makes clear that the climate anomaly of
927-28 did not cause substantial social change but rather the
Fig. 3 Annually-precise
palaeoclimate proxies for the
Byzantine Empire. The black line
marks the year AD 927. Lake Nar
δ18O data: Jones et al. 2006
values are reversed so that the
higher values represent wetter
winter conditions); summer
temperature anomalies are
relative to 1961-1990 (in °C):
PAGES 2k Consortium 2013 (r
correlation value between the
summer and annual temperature
reconstructions: 0.66)
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long winter was later connected with what the state and the
peasants perceived as a socioeconomic crisis. The long winter
was thus used as a way of understanding the reasons for the
social transformation as it accelerated this process and brought
it to contemporaries’ attention. The environmental stressor –
even if in physical terms it was not the harshest winter of the
tenth century – impinged upon the complex web of crop ecol-
ogies, social relations, and the state’s interests. Thus, it added
new momentum to the extant social dynamic – that of office-
holding elites accumulating wealth that allowed them to be-
come an increasingly powerful social group within contempo-
rary Byzantine society.
From a broad perspective, then, Byzantine society proved
resilient, surviving the crisis caused by the long winter of 927-
28. When seen from the point of view of specific social
groups, however, the price for this resilience was a significant
shift in the balance of socioeconomic relations. The winter of
927-28 offered an opportunity for the more affluent to take
advantage of peasants whose livelihoods depended on ecolog-
ical niches that were not capable of withstanding the effects of
a prolonged cold spell. Thanks to the buffers of their existing
estates, their accumulated gold, and their local connections
such elite groups could exploit local subsistence crises across
the Byzantine provinces in order to improve their situation
Fig. 4 Archaeological and
palaeoenvironmental proxies
showing that the economic
expansion in the Byzantine
Empire began already in the 10th
c. CE, prior to the BGreat Famine^
of 927 CE (original values were
standardized for the period of
300-1500 CE). Coin finds:
Harvey 1989, 86-89; Morrisson
2002 (average of standardized
values from individual sites,
showing polynomial trend line);
pollen data: Izdebski et al. 2015.
Pollen and coin find sites are
shown on Fig. 1
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with regard to both the producing population and the state
itself. Moreover, even though there is no concrete evidence,
we could expect the same dynamic to take place for other,
more local and less extreme environmental (and social)
stressors that occurred in the context of the social dynamic
of tenth-century society. In this way, environmental stressors
and the crises they provoked stimulated social evolution in the
Byzantine world.
The Sixteenth Century: Prolonged Drought
and Economic Crisis in the Ottoman Empire
Developments in the Ottoman Empire demonstrate how large-
scale state intervention in local settlement and land use could
aggravate rather than buffer environmental stress and amplify
the scale of social transformation it occasioned. During the
late sixteenth through early seventeenth centuries the empire
experienced a major crisis triggered by multiple environmen-
tal and human stressors, followed by a protracted and inter-
mittent recovery in terms of population, agricultural produc-
tion, political stability, and military power (as described in
more depth in White 2011). This period of Ottoman history
provides a well-documented illustration of the burden of resil-
ience in a pre-industrial Eastern Mediterranean society.
Although the state and Ottoman dynasty endured, their sur-
vival necessitated the abandonment of pre-crisis settlement
patterns, provisioning systems, and fiscal arrangements. The
burden of this transformation fell principally on the Anatolian
reaya (peasantry).
Until the crisis, the Ottoman Empire sustained its political
and economic resilience throughout rapid territorial expan-
sion. From modest beginnings in northwest Anatolia ca.
1300, Ottoman rulers conquered territory on three continents
covering all or part of 30 present-day countries. The empire
drew on administratively and geographically diverse sources
of tribute, taxation, and requisitions. It adapted pre-Ottoman
traditions and developed new systems to mobilize crucial re-
sources from distant locations to provision its cities and mili-
tary and to balance regions of surplus and deficit. These pro-
visioning systems included food (grains, rice, sheep), labour
(human and animal), and strategic materials (timber, gunpow-
der, alum etc.). The security provided by Ottoman soldiers as
well as legal and tax provisions encouraged the expansion of
agriculture and the containment of mobile pastoralism. When
tested by a series of local droughts, shortages, and famines
during the 1560s-1580s, Ottoman officials were able to con-
tain the damage by shifting tax burdens from the affected
areas, ordering fixed-price sales of grain from other provinces
and in some cases arranging direct shipments from local or
imperial granaries (Ágoston 2005; Mikhail 2011).
At the same time, the empire’s growth generated vulnera-
bilities at both the household and imperial scales. Cadastral
surveys and poll tax records (although imperfect sources of
data) provide strong indications of rapid population growth.
The number of individuals and rural households with little or
no land rose much faster than the population as a whole. The
overall output of grains and livestock grew, but agriculture
faced diminishing marginal returns, shrinking per capita pro-
duction and therefore limited surplus for imperial provision-
ing. At the imperial level, the growth of the capital (Istanbul),
major cities, army, and navy generated larger demands for
resources. To meet the needs of major military campaigns,
the empire depended on extraordinary taxation and requisi-
tions from the core provinces in Anatolia and the southern
Balkans (Cook 1972; Faroqhi 1984).
Expansion thus buffered Ottoman systems of resource, la-
bour, and military mobilization from small impacts but ex-
posed them to a growing risk of systemic breakdown in the
face of multiple, larger shocks. This situation helps explain the
scale of crisis in the empire during the 1590s-1600s. During
1591-96, central Anatolia experienced one of its longest and
deepest droughts of the past millennium, as described by con-
temporary sources and confirmed by tree-ring and lake sedi-
ment studies (Fig. 5) (Touchan et al. 2005; Roberts et al.
2012). Drought during the spring growing season appears to
have been especially damaging to the grain crop in central and
western Anatolia during the middle years of the decade. Food
prices more than doubled and some primary accounts suggest
food was often unavailable. During and after those years of
drought, there are anecdotal descriptions of extraordinarily
cold winters, a phenomenon possibly linked to large tropical
volcanic eruptions, including Nevado del Ruiz (1595) and
Huaynaputina (1600) (Sigl et al. 2015; Xoplaki et al. 2018).
The combination of drought and cold likely contributed to the
outbreak of a major epizootic disease, which affected sheep
and cattle across Anatolia, the Crimea, and the Balkans, even-
tually passing through Hungary into Central Europe. The
death of livestock deprived Ottoman peasants of a major
source of wealth and subsistence, and deprived Ottoman
armies of a key source of protein (White 2017).
The Ottoman Empire might have been able to contain the
crisis but for the distractions and demands of military cam-
paigns during the so-called Long War (1593-1607) with the
Habsburg Empire. Rather than reducing taxation or providing
relief supplies, as during previous droughts and famines,
Ottoman rulers actually increased requisitions from the worst
hit Balkan and Anatolian provinces, escalating shortages and
famines. Imperial demands for sheep from Karaman province
(the region around today’s Konya) appear to have been the
proximate cause for a major rural uprising, the Celâlî
Rebellion (1596-1610). Positive feedback among famine, vi-
olence, population displacement, and contagious disease gen-
erated a significant mortality crisis in parts of the empire.
Many households were displaced from rural to urban areas,
which faced higher levels of endemic and epidemic disease
and mortality. Pastoralists reoccupied much farmland
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abandoned during this mortality peak, which precluded its
immediate return to agriculture. Although exact figures are
impossible to come by, household counts in certain tax records
from the 1620s-30s suggest losses of half or more in many
parts of Anatolia since the 1580s (Özel 2016).
These decades of crisis witnessed what has been termed a
Btransformation^ of political and fiscal structures, or even the
beginning of a Bsecond Ottoman Empire,^ involving the mod-
ification or abandonment of some pre-crisis provisioning sys-
tems, systems of revenue-raising based on land holdings, and
military service in return for assignments of local revenues. In
their place, the empire resorted to cash taxes levied collective-
ly on groups of rural households as well as the sale of short-
term tax farms and the use of irregular mercenary armies
(sekban). Although these measures diminished the personal
authority of Ottoman sultans and entailed significant decen-
tralization of power, they enabled the imperial government to
co-opt potentially rebellious elites and to pay soldiers fre-
quently enough that the state and dynasty survived the extraor-
dinary turmoil of the early seventeenth century and eventually
developed more stable political and fiscal institutions (Darling
1996; Tezcan 2010).
This political survival, however, imposed significant
burdens on Anatolian peasants. The state could no longer
grant tax relief or implement sales or distributions of grain
to provinces facing poor harvests and shortages during the
frequent adverse climate conditions during the seventeenth
century. The immediate demands of short-term tax farmers
clashed with the need to restore stability and investment in
agriculture. State officials were no longer in a position to
ensure the tax exemptions and security from banditry that
had previously supported the expansion of rural settlement.
Communities facing violence and population loss, unable
to pay taxes levied on them collectively, often fled to towns
and cities, where they faced periodic persecution and ex-
pulsion (White 2011). The costs of imperial resilience thus
fell on those least able to bear it.
Conclusions
These case studies reveal the implications, or social burden, of
resilience in highly complex pre-modern societies. In all three
cases, the state as the central institution demonstrated resil-
ience to combined socio-environmental stressors over a period
of a few years to several decades. The scholarly focus on the
state in these cases often derives from the simple fact that
more surviving evidence covers this level of a given social
system. Keeping the focus on the state, however, occludes
the parallel processes taking place at other levels of a society.
The case study of the sixth century Roman Empire demon-
strates the difficulties a centralized decision-making apparatus
such as a government encounters when it attempts to balance its
interests (sustainable survival) with those of the institutions and
sectors under its influence (e.g., individual cities, industries, or
even elite constituencies). The tension between these sets of
interests and the power relations embedded in and between
the social system and its sub-systems shapes their response to
stress. This set of responses, in turn, becomes the reality within
which individuals operate and make their own decisions.
The case of Byzantium emphasizes the long-term unfore-
seen implications of environmental stress and the extent to
which the social context determines the actual socio-
economic impact of even a relatively modest stressor. It dem-
onstrates that the societal effects of such stressors can develop
slowly and over time while accelerating existing trends or
Fig. 5 Hydro-climate proxies for
Ottoman Anatolia: δ13C values
for the Sofular Cave and δ18O for
Lake Nar. The values are reversed
so that the higher values represent
wetter conditions. The black line
marks the year AD 1591. Sofular
Cave data: Göktürk et al. 2011
(with the revised STALAGE age-
depth model). Lake Nar: Jones et
al. 2006
Hum Ecol (2018) 46:291–303 299
exploiting existing vulnerabilities in society. The long winter
and subsistence crisis strained weaker social groups in
Byzantine society; stronger, wealthier groups of elites – with
connections to government structures – were not only better
buffered to stave off the crisis, but also exploited it to their
advantage. This in turn exacerbated the crisis for the weaker
groups and undermined the state’s potential capability to mit-
igate its effects, triggering a major famine.
TheOttomanEmpire illustrateshowpolitical resilience could
impose differential social and economic costs. For the state to
endure the crisis of the late sixteenth to early seventeenth centu-
ries it had to resort to short-term expedients that shifted burdens
onto rural populations and undercut elements of provincial pro-
visioningandsecurity.Theeffectsof thestate’sapproachcascad-
ed into longer-term changes, with large numbers of the
impoverished rural communities moving into urban areas, in-
creasing social unrest and decreasing the empire’s tax base.
The cases all demonstrate that socio-ecological resilience
incurs differential burdens across the levels of a social system,
and can further impose collateral costs at the same hierarchical
level (whereas the classical panarchy model tends to
emphasize effects between the different hierarchical levels of
the same system, see, for example, Holling 2001; Gunderson
and Holling 2002). Certain institutions, social groups and in-
dividuals pay more – a cost that can reach up to and including
their lives. In parallel, others can improve their position. As
such, socio-environmental stress can lay bare the configura-
tions of power within a social system as well as its working
and failing. Moreover, our case studies demonstrate that the
impacts of environmental stressors, and of the disasters asso-
ciated with their occurrence are themselves socially construct-
ed. They are modified by social circumstances and are articu-
lated through the networks of political institutions, social ac-
tors, economic relations and cultural phenomena in which
they are embedded (Janku et al. 2012; Schenk 2017).
Despite theirpowerandpotential todominate theexploitation
of available resources, pre-modern states did not necessarily fare
best, as illustrated by the case of tenth century Byzantium.
Vacuums created by the weakened state’s absence, such as the
former farmland in the sixteenth-century Ottoman Empire,
quickly can be taken over by more adaptive non-elite groups,
as was the case with the nomadic pastoralists who moved in to
replace the cultivators who had abandoned their lands. By the
same token, however, neither do all elites fare better than all non-
elites. The eliteswho lived in sixth-centuryApamea andBerytus
lost,whilevillagerswhomoved intoabandonedurbanhouses,or
the artisans of the silk industry in Constantinople, probably
gained. A major difference between elites and non-elites, how-
ever, is in the greater buffering capacity of the former.While the
elites of Apamea and perhaps Berytus could relocate elsewhere,
albeit with a cost to their well-being and personal finances, the
risk faced by non-elites such as those employed in Berytus’ silk
industry was substantially higher.
These historical case studies provide important insights into
the discussion within current research on social-environmental
resilience as the Bgold standard^ for future policy-making, in the
context of growing environmental concerns (e.g., global climate
change; for problems associated with this approach, see Cote and
Nightingale 2012; Olsson et al. 2015; Olsson 2017). They dem-
onstrate the importance of being aware of implicit value judge-
ments as well as the interests of all social groups involved, even
those which are normally not involved as stakeholders in
decision-making processes. By contextualizing resilience, our
work touches upon the notion of environmental justice, namely
the fair treatment of all people with respect to the benefits they
can draw from the environment, and the risks from it to which
they are exposed. In this context, we can suggest that the deep
roots of some of the social challenges of the twenty-first century,
including poverty, can be traced back to mechanisms that are
much older than our contemporary global order (Fitzpatrick
2014). Moreover, as our case studies demonstrate, these chal-
lenges are integral to the structure of a social-economic system
itself and are not in themselves caused by climate change or any
other environmental stressor. This should assist in recognising
both the real scale of the problem and in encouraging more
comprehensive approaches to its solutions.
There can be no doubt of the value of studying the historical
past for resilience theory in light of the countless surviving pre-
industrial case studies that demonstrate social responses to envi-
ronmental stressors (on integrating history and palaeoscience, see
Haldon et al. 2014; Izdebski et al. 2016; Haldon et al. 2018).
These case studies offer observers the opportunity to trace the
results of socio-environmental interactions retrospectively over
different chronological time frames. The wide spatial perspective
offered by the historical examples presented here permits consid-
eration of the interests of and outcomes for the multiple sub-
groups that are the subject of our investigation. By the same
token, historical research also reveals the importance of taking
into account the interests, perceptions, and beliefs of all those
involved within a system when considering questions of resil-
ience (Haldon and Rosen, this issue).
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